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IndonesiaI
Eric R. W. Knighta,, James D. Meadea
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of Sydney Business School

Abstract
This paper considers the nature of assessing productivity and effectiveness in infrastructure investment in
the context of governments’ increasing investment in new infrastructure. Taking the case of energy infrastructure investment within Indonesia, this paper makes three contributions: (i) develops a model for assessing
infrastructure productivity based on landscape, regime and niche-level changes, (ii) suggests the interconnection between these levels based on sequencing multi-level changes over time, and (iii) shows the role of
supply and demand side initiatives in enabling new infrastructure investment is evaluated.
Keywords: Infrastructure; Investment; Productivity; Multi-Level Perspectives Framework; Innovation

Abstrak
Artikel ini mempertimbangkan sifat dari penilaian produktivitas dan efektivitas pada investasi infrastruktur
dalam rangka peningkatan investasi pemerintah pada infrastruktur baru. Dengan menggunakan kasus
investasi infrastruktur energi di Indonesia, artikel ini menghasilkan tiga hal: (i) nembangun model untuk
menilai produktivitas infrastruktur berdasarkan perubahan dari lanskap, rezim, dan perubahan di level yang
tepat, (ii) menunjukkan interkoneksi antar level-level tersebut berdasarkan perubahan multi-level yang
berurutan dari waktu ke waktu, dan (iii) menunjukkan peran dari inisiatif sisi penawaran dan permintaan
yang memungkinkan investasi infrastruktur baru untuk dievaluasi.
Kata kunci: Infrastruktur; Investasi; Produktivitas; Kerangka Perspektif Multi-Level; Inovasi
JEL classifications: O25; O33; O38

1. Introduction
Over the next two decades, one of the most significant issues facing public sector managers and
policy makers is the urgent need to increase investment in infrastructure assets. A recent McKinsey report, argues that between US$57 trillion
and US$67 trillion is needed in economic infrastructure over the next twenty years to support trend
rate economic growth (Dobbs et al. 2013). In developing economies such as Brazil, Indonesia and
I This study was made possible by grant funding from the
Sydney Southeast Asia Centre. All errors and omissions are
the authors’ own.
 Corresponding Address: Senior Lecturer in Innovation and
Management, University of Sydney Business School. Visiting
Research Fellow at University of Oxford, Oxford University Centre for the Environment. E-mail: eric.knight@econ.usyd.edu.
au.

India, public sector managers face an especially
acute challenge with committed spending lagging
required infrastructure spending in the order of two
to three percentage points of GDP.
Not with standing the pressure on national budgets
worldwide, scholars have argued that the financing gap in infrastructure has not been created by
a dearth of available private capital but by weak
institutional frameworks in national economies to
attract, absorb and retain private infrastructure investment (O’Neill 2009). For example, over the last
decade, institutional investors have commenced
building in-house capabilities for direct investment
in infrastructure (Clark & Monk 2013a; 2013b) in
response to the growth in pension capital seeking
stable, long-term returns.
Whilst several studies have examined the availability of private capital to invest in infrastructure (Hebb
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& Sharma 2014; Knight & Sharma 2016), fewer
have examined the market level settings to attract
infrastructure investment. Specifically, although innovation frameworks account for how products attract new technology investment, less is known
about how these apply to large, capital-intensive
projects such as infrastructure. This is a gap since
public sector managers are under pressure to justify the quality of public spending on infrastructure
and ensure productivity.

This paper proposes a framework for assessing
the productivity of project investment in infrastructure investment using an in-depth qualitative
case study from an exemplar market: Indonesia
and infrastructure investment in the geothermal
sector. Indonesia has the world’s largest geothermal power development potential at around 27 gigawatts (GW) (World Bank 2008), yet only 1.2 GW
has been installed to date. This is in spite of growing population and rising electricity prices driving
demand for electricity infrastructure. However, in
2014, following over a decade of public-private
cooperation, Indonesia completed financing of its
US$1.6 bn Sarulla geothermal project, making it
the largest geothermal project in the world (Asian
Development Bank 2010). This paper examines
how market level changes have enabled this transition to take effect.

Building on a multi-level perspective in innovation economics, the aim of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of infrastructure finance and technology innovation in three specific
areas. First, we propose a model for assessing infrastructure productivity in order to account for the
transition towards greater and more efficient infrastructure spending. A multi-level perspective is applied to an infrastructure market setting to account
for regime-level, landscape and niche changes.
Second, we examine how multi-level changes are
sequenced over time and the interconnection between changes at each level. Finally, a distinction
between supply and demand side initiatives and
their interaction in enabling new infrastructure investment is demonstrated. In doing so, we hope to
extend our understanding of public sector administration of infrastructure investment.
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1.1. Background
Management economists have long wrestled with
the question of how new, innovative ideas are
brought to market (March 1991; Thompson 2003).
Some have argued that both exploitation and exploration were necessary in dynamic economics
(Cameron & Quinn 1988; March 1991). Exploitation referred to concepts of efficiency, repetition,
incremental improvement, and reduced costs. This
is enabled by organizations and economic actors
building consistent patterns around existing behaviors. Exploration, by contrast, is associated with
search, discovery, innovation and change. This enables economic actors to pursue new activities that
exist beyond business as usual activities. Although
early management scholarship tended to focus on
mechanistic structures for markets that privileged
the ability of actors to pursue exploitation (Burns &
Stalker 1966), March (1991) argued that both exploitation and exploration were essential for markets to flourish (O’Reilly & Tushman 2013).
In seeking to account for how economies respond
to these tensions, traditional economic analysis prioritized equilibrium pricing models for inputs and
outputs. The assumption underlying this model is
that, in a perfectly competitive market, an equilibrium reached by trading between buyers and sellers at market prices is economically efficient and
that, ceteris paribus, such an equilibrium could be
achieved with any mix of resources (Arrow & Debreu 1954). An alternative, evolutionary model of
change and stability argues that ceteris paribus assumptions need to be adjusted under certain conditions (Farjoun 2010).
A key text in this alternate approach is Nelson &
Winter’s (1982) Evolutionary Theory of Economic
Change. Building on Schumpeter’s (1976) work on
innovation economics and Herb Simon’s work on
bounded rationality, Nelson & Winter (1982) argued that economic actors tended towards selfreinforcing routines which were capable of creating
path dependence within existing regimes. These
routines could be understood broadly to include
technical, procedural, organizational and strategic
processes (Nelson & Winter 1982). In accounting
for the possibility of routine, management scholars
focused on how these routines could be broken in
order to enable regime change. These processes
may be slow-moving and consistent (Eisenhardt
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1989), or proceed in fast-moving shifts or "punctuated equilibrium" (Benner & Tushman 2003).
Whilst these models accounts for why economies
were compelled by stasis or otherwise, they offers
relatively little insight into how economies break
out of these dependencies.
The theoretical framework applied in this in-depth
case study builds on the multi-level perspectives (MLP) literature to account for the nature
of regime-level change (Schot, Hoogma & Elzen
1994) (Schot & Geels 2008; Geels 2005; 2002).
The MLP scholarship envisages socio-technical
change taking place at three distinct levels: landscapes, regimes and niches (Geels 2002; 2005).
Landscapes are the broadest level of change and
refer to macro factors such as social trends, political values, and environmental issues. Regime
changes refer to changes within particular social groups and communities within a given system. In the MLP literature this is taken to include
user practices, scientific communities and emerging technologies. In this paper legislative and policy changes are also included. Finally, niches refer
to micro changes that operate within specific local,
project or site based variations.
MLP scholars argue that types of socio-technical
change vary based on the levels being changed
and identify three types of change (Geels & Kemp
2006). Firstly, reproduction refers to changes to
the regime level only, with no changes at the landscape and niche levels. In these circumstances, organizations within the market may be reorganized
but there is little shift in trajectory of underlying path
dependencies. Secondly, transformation refers to
changes at the regime and landscape level with no
changes at the niche level. Here, institutional settings are adjusted but there is little change to the
specific projects or organizations on the ground.
Finally, transition is achieved when all three levels
change in order to enable a major qualitative shift
in the economic system. If successful, transitions
enable changes to the underlying knowledge base
and infrastructure of the economy.
Building on these MLP distinctions a theoretical
model for ’transition’ in the infrastructure sector
within economies is proposed. As indicated above,
infrastructure investment has been identified as a
source of long-term economic growth and productivity, yet a disparity has emerged between the supply and demand for infrastructure investment. This

suggests that infrastructure markets may be affected by path dependencies which impeded equilibrium. Yet, individual cases indicate that these
path dependencies are not persistent in all cases.
An exemplar case is included to illustrate this proposed model for transition, followed by an extrapolation of the implications for innovations and management literature. This methodological approach
is designed to offer theoretical elaboration based
on rich, contextual detail of the policy settings. In
the following section, the case context is set out,
and changes at the landscape, regime, and niche
level over four decades in Indonesia are examined.
Interventions are then distinguished based upon
whether they are targeted at infrastructure supply
or demand. Supply refers to the financial, legal,
and technical provisions to enable infrastructure
construction whereas demand refers to the conditions for utilization.

1.2. Context
In developing this model for transition towards
greater infrastructure investment, a market in
which infrastructure financing pressures were
acute and where some level of transitional success
had been achieved was sought. The geothermal
infrastructure investment market in Indonesia was
suitable for two reasons.
First, Indonesia faces a striking gap between demand for energy infrastructure and supply. It has
the world’s largest geothermal power development
potential with 40% of the world’s known resource
base, yet much of its capacity remains uninstalled
(Polycarp, Brown & Fu-Bertaux 2013). By the late
1990s, only 527 MW of installed geothermal capacity was in operation across five fields. This discrepancy was in spite of rising electricity prices and
a highly concentrated electricity market with almost
80% of supply coming from a single source: fossil
fuels.
Secondly, Indonesia has subsequently achieved
a measure of transitional success in securing
public and private investment into the sector. In
March 2014, the US$1.6 billion Sarulla geothermal project was finalized, making it the most important geothermal power project in Indonesia and the
largest in the world to date. At a time when electricity prices are projected to grow in Indonesia by 8%
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per year until 2029, the Sarulla project introduces
320.8 MW of installed capacity into the grid from
2018 (Asian Development Bank 2010; (Polycarp,
Brown & Fu-Bertaux 2013).

1.3. Landscape Changes
Securing the Sarulla project was a culmination of
interventions over three decades across numerous stakeholders. Early interventions by the Indonesian government and the multilateral banking community increased awareness of Indonesia’s
geothermal resources and assisted private sector
stakeholders in project selection.
Supply side interventions. On the supply side, the
government committed to conducting an extensive survey of geothermal resources in a 1972
inventory. This inventory was an important driver
for development by bringing more attention to the
country’s assets and engaging the international
community in technical assistance. Through the
1970s several international partners including the
United States and Japan provided technical assistance to Indonesia to consolidate this inventory.
This supported detailed engineering assessments
of the country’s geothermal potential, and helped
build public sector management capability to vet
projects.
The 1972 inventory formed the basis for Indonesia’s early projects in geothermal. Through the
early 1990s, Pertamina, the country’s state-owned
oil company, financed five geothermal plants which
brought 527 MW of power into the grid.
In addition to this, the government reconfigured its
policy settings to support industry development. A
geothermal law was introduced in 2003 that produced a roadmap for future geothermal development in the country. A target was set to bring on
6,000 MW of capacity by 2020, and a number
of restrictions inhibiting private investors were relaxed. Specifically, the new law allowed the private sector to bid for development projects in competitive tenders rather than forming joint operating
agreements with Pertamina. This increased transparency in the commercialization process. Furthermore, responsibility for certain approvals and licensing were devolved to the regional government
level (Polycarp, Brown & Fu-Bertaux 2013).
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Whilst these reforms enabled supply side infrastructure development, there were several limitations. First, the 2003 geothermal law distributed
construction risk solely to the developer. This impeded the ability of financial intermediaries to enter
the market through novel risk-management instruments. Secondly, although delegated authority for
approvals to regional government was intended to
improve the approval process, in practice regional
governments were under-resourced. Few governments had the capacity to run a successful tender
process for the assets, and information on the asset potential was too limited to attract private investors.
Demand side interventions. Whilst supply side
measures were progressively moving towards releasing supply capacity, separate policy levers
were dampening demand for geothermal electricity. Specifically, the government continued to subsidize competing sources of electricity.
Electricity is a commodity product irrespective of
source. Thus, subsidies to coal powered capacity
distorted price signals in market relative to other
sources of energy. In the early 2000s, for example, the Indonesian government responded to supply pressures by fast-tracking 10,000 MW of power
generation capacity through coal power. This negatively impacted investor confidence due to a lack
of a clear pricing structure for geothermal energy
((Polycarp, Brown & Fu-Bertaux 2013).

1.4. Regime Changes
Landscape-level changes helped improve the
project selection process for geothermal projects.
These have been estimated elsewhere to constitute up to 8% of the investment costs of infrastructure projects (Dobbs et al. 2013). Regimelevel changes, however, helped translate improved
project selection into a more systematic process
for permitting and implementing major projects.
Supply-side changes. Project approvals and permitting of major projects can account for up to
15% of investment costs (Dobbs et al. 2013). However, these processes often sit on the ’critical path’
and block the completion of major projects. An example is the US$4 bn 2,0000 MW Central Java
Power Plan. There has been a delay of three years
between the completion of the power purchase
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agreement and financial settlement due to difficulty
in securing part of the land on the project site.
Since the banks are unwilling to commit to finance
until these land approvals are secured, projects
can incur large costs in project delivery and execution.

set by regional differences in the cost of production.

In the geothermal market, a US$145 million
geothermal fund was established in 2011 to assist
with initial exploration, survey, and discovery costs.
The purpose of this fund was to reduce some of the
barriers imposed by large upfront costs, and significant delays in the early discovery stages. In addition the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources
created a new Directorate General for New and
Renewable Energy whereby approval processes
could be expedited.

Landscape and regime changes have only recently been consolidated in the successful financial closing of the Sarulla geothermal project. This
is the first Greenfield geothermal project to be
financed since the Wayand Windu Geothermal
Power Project in 1997, and was syndicated between the government, private investors and the
multilateral banking community. The project utilizes
steam, brine and gas resources in the North Sumatra Province, and will be subject to a 30 year power
purchase agreement. A number of project specific
or niche commitments secured the financing for the
project.

To assist in this process, the World Bank introduced a program with the Global Environment Facility in 2008 to help implement the 2003 geothermal law. A difficulty with the law was that many of
the attending rules and regulations had not been
clarified, thereby making it difficult for investors
to commit to transactions. The World Bank program, together with subsequent programs from the
international development community, supported
’project readiness’ resources. This included international expertise on conducting feasibility studies, environmental and social impact assessments,
and training of provincial governments on how to
run tendering processes to attract private investment. These activities alone constitute between
three to five percent of investment costs.
Demand-side changes. As part of the effort to
stipulate regulations under the 2003 geothermal
law, the Indonesian government introduced a pricing regime around geothermal electricity. Initially in
2009, geothermal was given a fixed maximum tariff of 9.7 cents per kWh. This was not financially attractive as it barely made geothermal projects profitable. In 2011, revised regulations introduced flexibility by allowing the winners of geothermal tenders to negotiate with Perusahaan Listrik Negara
(PLN), Indonesia’s state-owned utility, on a variable rate. However, PLN were not required to purchase this power (Crosetti 2012, Wahjosoedibjo &
Hasan 2012). In July 2012, these regulations were
changed again to introduce a variable feed-in tariff,
ranging from 10 cents and 17 cents per kWh (Pramudatama 2012). This gave investors some certainty around geothermal pricing, without variation

1.5. Niche Changes

Supply-side changes. Although the equity for the
project was put up by private sector project sponsors, the multilateral development banks offered
variable loan terms to mitigate political risk. Specifically, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation
extended a US$329 m political risk guarantee to
cover potential scheduling, monitoring or approval
delays caused by political factors. In the past,
change of governments has posed a problem as
project approvals have been reversed when new
governments enter parliament. However, Indonesia’s PT Sarana Multi Infrastructure (SMI), an independent unit responsible for syndicating publicprivate infrastructure partnership has sought to develop a special law that binds commitments of the
central and the local government to realizing infrastructure projects notwithstanding a change in government. This has enabled the multilateral development banks to offer political risk guarantees that
ease investor concerns.
Secondly, extensive support from the government
and multilateral community enabled the Sarulla
project to be proposed as a single, integrated
project in which three separate power generating units are financed as a whole. Typically, large
projects are segmented as project sponsors seek
more detail of reserve analyses, technical and legal due diligence reports, and other independent
advice. However, the supportive measure on this
front enabled the commercial operation to be consolidated, thereby making the approval process
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simpler and more efficient.
Finally, the projected operating costs for the
geothermal project were simpler than coal-fired
power plants thereby making the financing less
risky. Typically, power purchase agreements entered into with PLN required full pass-through of all
fuel costs to the project owners (and, by extension,
consumers). This can lead to some uncertainty
about the projected profitability of the projects. This
is especially the case for coal-fired power plants
were input costs are significant and variable due to
fluctuating commodity prices. In geothermal power,
by contrast, all costs are accounted for upfront
thereby removing pricing volatility.
Demand-side changes. In the Sarulla project, the
Indonesian government agreed to guarantee certain payments made by PLN to the project owners under the energy sales contract via a Business
Viability Guarantee Letter. This gave project owners greater certainty around revenue in the early
years of the project. In addition, the introduction of
global carbon pricing gave the project the possibility of additional credit-linked revenues in the future. Although the future of the CDM is uncertain,
the project is structured in a way that means it may
be eligible for earning future credits. It is currently
expected to avoid 1.3 tons of carbon dioxide emissions per well.

1.6. Discussion and Implications
Governments around the world acknowledge that
infrastructure investment has not kept track with
the demand for new assets (Doornbosch & Knight
2008). In order to examine how governments close
this gap, this paper examined the in-depth base of
the geothermal market in Indonesia.
The findings of this in-depth study suggest
that government initiatives may be categorized
into three levels: landscape, regime, and niche
changes. In the context of infrastructure investment, landscape changes give greater visibility and
transparency to project assets. This includes initiatives that support project scoping, initial inventories, and feasibility studies of potential projects.
Regime changes translate these transparency initiatives into detailed regulations and rules that
detail how intended projects can be brought to
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fruition. This includes support regarding project approvals, environmental studies, as well as pricing arrangements. Finally, niche changes refer to
project-specific conditions that enable counterparties to the project to enter into an agreement. Figure 1 illustrates the proposed theoretical model for
infrastructure transition.
This model advances the literature on technology
innovation and infrastructure investment in three
respects (Geels 2002; 2005; Schot, Hoogma &
Elzen 1994). First, by applying an MLP framework
to infrastructure investment, we give greater clarity to how infrastructure productivity may be assessed. The MLP framework has typically been
applied to product markets, which differs from infrastructure investment because the investment
timeframes are much shorter and the public sector has a less clearly defined role in market creation. By applying the MLP framework to infrastructure, we propose a framework for thinking
through the productivity of public infrastructure
investments. Cost/benefit models are difficult to
construct across infrastructure sectors because of
varying underlying assumptions to revenue (Torrance 2007; 2009). For example, the projected
cash flow for hospital projects will differ significantly to rail or energy projects due to assumptions in pricing, demand volumes, and operating
conditions that rely on government priorities. We
therefore extracted a process-based model which
takes into account these macro (landscape-level)
factors, and highlighted the key project costs related to initial search activity, project due diligence,
and completion facing infrastructure investment.
In the case of Indonesia, we found that there
have been specific interventions targeted at each
of these process barriers. Initiatives by the Indonesian government in the early 1970s reduced
some of the search costs related to infrastructure
finance, thereby laying the basis for market entry.
Through the 1990s and early 2000s, detailed regulations and technical assistance made it easier for
project sponsors to conduct project due diligence
by setting clear parameters for investment and reducing project delivery costs. Finally, bespoke contractual arrangements such as the Business Viability Guarantee Letter in the Sarulla project assisted
final project completion. Taken together, multi-level
initiatives were crucial in readying the market landscape for infrastructure investment.
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Figure 1: A MLP model of infrastructure investment in Indonesia

Secondly, the proposed model sequences the
multi-level interventions longitudinally, following
the logic of project selection, delivery, and completion. The current MLP perspective accounts
for distinctions between ’reproduction’, ’transformation’, and ’transition’ by accounting for the number of levels engaged at any one time (Geels &
Kemp 2006; Geels 2005; Kemp 1994). For example, regime level changes without landscape
or niche changes may result is minimal overall
socio-technical change (Kemp 1994). By contrast,
changes at all three levels enable socio-technical
transition.
The proposed model is then extended by suggesting that the sequence of level change is significant. In the case of Indonesia’s geothermal market, landscape-level changes were important before regime or niche level changes could take effect before project selection barriers precede completion barriers. Thus, initiatives to remove completion barriers early on (such as project support for
the Sarullo project) may not be effective if they are
introduced without sufficient change at the landscape and regime levels. Conversely, niche level
changes for the Sarullo project in 2014 were only
effective because of the long history of landscape
and regime changes. The proposed model accounts for these changes by applying the logic of
project development, from search, due diligence,
and completion as outlined in Figure 1.
Finally, this paper asserts that both supply and
demand side initiatives are important to change
any one level. Previous studies of infrastructure
tend to focus on either supply or demand side

changes. For example, studies of sovereign wealth
investment in infrastructure have tended to focus
on investor capability to complete direct investment, or barriers to market transparency (Clark,
Dixon & Monk 2013). Elsewhere, scholars examined demand-level price signals without considering the importance of non-price based initiatives
that remove early stage barriers (Howarth 2012).
Further it is proposed that supply and demand
initiatives are interdependent. Thus supply initiatives without demand initiatives lead to wasted
resources as governments and the private sector pursue scoping studies for projects that are
not economically viable. Conversely, demand initiatives without sufficient attention to supply constraints leads to a low number of viable projects.
For example, in the clean energy sector, investment into clean energy projects remained low despite the introduction of a carbon price due to early
stage barriers in energy infrastructure related to
capital intensity of clean tech infrastructure (Knight
2012). In order to match supply and demand effectively over the long term, interdependence between these initiatives is needed in order to enable
greater infrastructure investment.
While this proposed theoretical model addresses
gaps in infrastructure financing, there are limitations to the approach used in its development.
First, an exemplar case was used to highlight the
elements of the proposed model but empirical evidence is needed to test the model. A challenge
with market-level empirical studies in infrastructure
is how to measure successful performance as performance may be inconsistent (Hebb & Sharma
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2014). Future studies might take a longitudinal approach by following a single market (such as the
geothermal market) over a long period of time,
rather than taking a cross-sectional study across
all infrastructure markets. A second limitation in
this study is how the levels are defined. Lastly, the
proposed model was applied to a specific infrastructure market setting to propose how the model
might apply in the context of steps towards project
completion. However, this may limit the generalizability to other markets or indeed other types of infrastructure, which should be an area for future research. Thus, in order to extend this research over
time, we propose considering this model for other
sectors.

2. Conclusion
Governments are under increasing pressure to
close the gap between infrastructure supply and
demand. Some have called on the G20 to be more
productive in its approach to infrastructure investment and establish a global infrastructure productivity institute. Whatever the merits of the proposal,
how governments encourage infrastructure investment at a time of growing government deficit remains a conundrum. This paper has sought to
shed light on this problem by formulating a model
by which infrastructure productivity can be analyzed, and used a successful exemplar to point the
way to future public and private partnership in this
area.
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